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Introduction
One  of  the  most  challenging  task  is a ssessment  of  effects  of  public  intervention  on 
development. Outcome of such an analysis depends on a number of assumptions made and 
factors taken into account. In particular in countries that have limited experience with large 
development type  interventions   such as  Cohesion policy,  with  its specific  assumptions, 
strategies, aims, rules etc.  What is more, its implementation takes place in a complex, more 
and  more  global,  recently  also  turbulent  environment,  what  makes  the  methodology  of 
evaluation studies real difficult. This complexity of environment and of activities may be one 
of the reasons that opinions on usefulness of Cohesion policy varies not only among societies 
and politicians, but also in Academia. And Poland is among new Member States, where a 
number of processes influences the path and pace of development. To mention just the key: 
socio-economic transformation in the nineties, globalization and European transformation 
processes  (different  but  interlinked),  move  from  industrial  era  to  postindustrial  one 
(knowledge based economy and information society). Understanding the differences between 
them is a problem for most people. 
Despite the fact that Poland was the first in Central and Eastern Europe to get back to the 
growth path after 1989 and the only EU-27 Member State which did not suffer seriously from 
recent Eurozone crisis, still as far as GDP is concerned it belongs to the group of 2-3 least 
developed EU countries. And Cohesion policy is widely considered the key factor which may 
help create strong, competitive, inclusive economy. By many without European funds Poland 
would not cope so successfully with the potential crisis as it did. The position taken here is 
that there is a lot of misunderstanding behind most popular notions on Cohesion policy.
Main objective of this article is relatively modest in outlining key difficulties in designing 
national version of Cohesion policy and understanding the role of its planned and achieved 
outcome for the development.  Main thesis of this article is that most studies and reports on 
Cohesion policy impact on Poland’s development leads to overly positive conclusions (with 
mentaland political background).  The reasons are multidimensional and in general stem from 
the paradigm adopted, which has profound influence on such questions as choice of factors used for diagnosis, design of development priorities, coherence within the system of strategic 
documents and programmes, as well as the way evaluations are structured and realized. An 
underlying assumption is that for the Cohesion policy to contribute to long-term development 
of Poland it has to accept new development paradigm, concentrate on quality rather than 
quantity of projects co-financed, on attain objectives  rather than disbursement of funding, and 
on effects rather than products.  That is to use it as an instruments and not a goal in itself. In 
order to prove that there is significant incoherence in the system  (European, not only Polish, 
but Poland will serve as an example), the following issues shall be analysed:
- Factors influencing development of contemporary Poland;
- General structure of Cohesion policy  intervention in Poland;
- Internal coherence (strategic  vs operational  level aims)
- Evaluation reports, studies and their conclusions.
Method  applied:  desk  research,  interviews  with  specialists  in c harge  of  development,  
Cohesion policy and evaluation. The logic model concept will serve as a basis for reasoning.
1
Main  sources  of  information  are  official  documents  of  the  Cohesion  policy,  evaluation 
reports, literature available.
Factors influencing development
The discussions about the needed cohesion policy intervention structure for different countries 
and regions leads to the conclusion that there is a quite strong notion in less developed areas 
that their development depends on other factors (and intervention) than in case of these better 
developed.  That  they have  to take  the same development path  which  was taken by best 
developed regions more than half a century ago. This is visibly reflected in the structure of CP 
2007-2013: in one Europe there is a convergence objective offered to underdeveloped regions 
(most of Central and Eastern Europe), with no formal obligation to earmark resources for new 
development paradigm related activities
2, and competitiveness objective for already pretty 
well competitive areas with an obligation of spending on new paradigm related activities not 
less  than  75%  of  CP  funding  made available. What  development  factors  are  accepted as 
typical  for this phase of EU  (if  not  global)  development? In  the  long-run,  is t his vi sible 
                                                                           
1  See: McLaughlin J.A., Jordan G.B., Using Logic Models, [in:] Wholey, J.S., Hatry, H.P. & Newcomer, K.E. 
(red.) Handbook of Practical Program Evaluation, s.7-32. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass
2 With resources spent predominantly on hard infrastructure rather than entrepreneurship and human capital.application of two different paradigms to two parts of the EU territory development a good 
choice in the 21th century?
A short literature overview leads to a conclusion that unlike in an industrial era, technical 
infrastructure  is n ot  anymore  a sufficient  condition  of  development.  Instead  of  creating 
growth, it rather helps to speed it up and make it more effective, while true development 
factors are of “soft” character. Human capital is stressed all over the world though there are 
some opinions that kept in isolation from other factors may be less effective than expected 
(Pike et al 2006). Social capital, a concept developed by Coleman and Putnam, is increasingly 
used to explain interregional  differences.  Landes (1993), Harrison and Hunington (2003) 
declare that culture is a major factor determining chances to develop, while Keating et al. 
(2003)  put stress on relationship between culture and institutions.  Innovations  in knowledge 
economies  (Cooke  2002)  and  innovative  milieu  (Camagni 1991)  concepts treat ability  to 
innovate as a key condition of competitiveness. Florida (2000) started from the same position 
to move towards specific 3T concept (development “seeks” places where talent, tolerance and 
technology coexist)(2004). Castells (1996), starting from the  old concept of clusters, suggests 
that  it  is networks  what  makes places  competitive. The  metropolization of  development 
(concentration of growth in metropolises) is widely accepted fact of life, extensively used in 
development policies. General conclusion from this review is that while material and financial 
capital are still of importance, their effective usage depends more and more on intangible 
factors. As we will see, this is an approach that is strongly represented also on the strategic 
levelin Poland.
Structure of Cohesion policy intervention in Poland
It may be assumed that the structure of any public intervention to a large extent reflects the 
paradigm  adopted.  Industrial  era  paradigm  would  concentrate  on  hard  infrastructure 
development, in line with Keynes concept. Such an approach was typical all over the world 
till  the  end  of  1960s.  Costly  motorway  system  in  pre-war  Germany  and  Italy,  huge 
infrastructural investments in Appallachian region, Tennessee Valley Authority are among 
best examples echoed in the so called socialist countries. Despite the fact that global crisis of 
1970s led to introduction of new development paradigm, this process of change has met in 
various  areas  and  social  circles  unexpectedly  strong  social  barriers. It turned  out  that 
historically accumulated common cumulative put many social groups into “lock-in” situation (previous success as a barrier to restructuring and modernization). It happened particularly 
often  in  previously  successful  industrial  regions  undergoing  or  threatened  by  dramatic 
restructuring (Ruhr Basin, Newcastle region, Upper Silesia and many other). Facing new and 
turbulent  future  most  typical  response  was to protect old industries  and  way of life:  if 
successful for century, should be successful now.  As a rule, such approach never worked but 
led to increase ofthe costs of delayed transformation. 
Surprisingly,  problems  with  getting  acceptance  for  new  paradigm  nowadays   i t  is not 
exclusively the case of less developed countries and regions. Eastern Germany after 1990 is a 
perfect example of modern form of “colonization” of newly re-united 5 Neue Laenders and 
heavy investment into infrastructure. As a result of such a policy ignoring social and political 
conditions, Eastern Germany is lagging behind, suffers from unemployment, outmigration and 
faces demographic  catastrophy.  Two  thousands  of billions  euro spent  up-to-date did not 
transform Eastern Germany into flourishing land. Does such propensity to use old paradigm  
happen in other countries, like Poland?
In Poland in the period of 2004-2006, just after accession, planned Cohesion policy activities 
were defined in National Development Plan (2003)
3. It formulated 5 objectives:
-support to long-term high GDP growth;
- employment and education;
- inclusion into European transport and information infrastructure;
- increase of the share of high value added sectors in the economy, ICT development;
- support to inclusion of all groups and regions into development and modernization processes 
(NPR 2003: 64).
Aforementioned objectives obviously reflect high priority given to elements of new paradigm. 
However, when it comes to final operational decisions on structure of spending, propensity to 
accept new paradigm turned out to be much more limited.
4 In general, over 60% of funds 
                                                                           
3 By the way in parallel to designing operational programs
4 Enterprise Competitiveness Growth Operational Program had a relatively large suport planned to businesses. 
Part in the form of grants to cover the costs of infrastructural and equipment investment, while other part in 
the form of grant to innovative projects. It turned out soon, that there is high demand for the first type, while 
no demand for the latte. Under media and social pressures  to spend money, the resources earmarked for 
innovation were transferred to the other activity and consumed soon. The demand from beneficiaries was of 
high significance.were earmarked for hard infrastructure,  ca 24% for widely understood entrepreneurship and 
ca 15% - human resources development (see MRD 2010 a: 26, 33).  Relatively low level of 
spending on other than infrastructural projects was noted in ex-post evaluation of Cohesion 
policy programs (EC 2010). Taking into account that certain projects in the last two areas 
were also of infrastructural character, real share of infrastructural spending was close to 70%, 
that  is not different from  Greece. Interestingly,  despite the  fact that  for not convincing 
reasons  instead of  a number of regional  operational  programs there  was one “integrated 
regional development program”, that is centralized and managed by one of central ministries 
(finally Ministry for Regional Development), under bottom-up pressures from the regions that 
program  was  even  more  hard  infrastructure oriented.  It  was  clear  that there  is w ide gap 
between official strategic pro-Lisbon approach and more than traditional point of view on 
development factors among beneficiaries and local elites (Gorzelak & Kozak 2008).
In the programming period of 2007-2013 the overall structure did not change, though for the 
first time the Polish government made a serious effort to earmark large amounts of funding to 
Lisbon  Strategy  type  projects.  The strategic objectives of  the  national strategic  reference 
framework left no doubt: “The strategic goal of the National Strategic Reference Framework 
for Poland is creation of the conditions for the growth of competitiveness of knowledge based 
economy and entrepreneurship which are to assure an increase in the employment and in the 
level of social, economic and territorial cohesion.” (MRD 2007:50). There were following 6 
specific objectives adopted :
-Improving the functioning standard of public institutions and development of partnership
mechanisms,
- Improving the human capital quality and enhancing social cohesion,
- Establishment and modernisation of technical and social infrastructure crucial for better
competitiveness of Poland,
-Improving the competitiveness and innovativeness of enterprises, including in particular
the manufacturing sector with high added value and development of the services
sector,
-Increase of the competitiveness of Polish regions and preventing their social, economic
and territorial marginalization,
- Balancing growth  opportunities  and supporting structural changes on  rural  areas  (MRD 
2007) .As said,  major part of resources  was earmarked  for hard  infrastructure.  Unfortunately,  in 
practice large part of it was spent on local, isolated projects, with little or no influence on job 
and income creation (MRD 2009), at the expense of delayed implementation of large strategic 
infrastructure
5 .  One may ask, if in the previous period there were problems with spending 
relatively small amount on innovative projects in enterprises, how is it possible that since 
2007  the progress  in i mplementation of  large,  €  8,3  billion  worth   I nnovative  Economy 
Operational Program is running relatively smoothly? The answer is simple: this is due to 
relaxing projectselection criteria
6. 
Impressive was the dedication of the Government to earmark as much as possible resources to 
Lisbon Strategy type of activities (absolutely voluntarily, as there is no legal obligation). Of 
the total resources available,  in t he period  2007-2013  earmarking  level has  reached  64% 
(Kierzkowski 2009: 762). However again the regions, for the first time playing the role of 
managing authorities of 16 individual regional programs, have shown much less enthusiasm 
for earmarking. At various conferences and meetings they left no doubt that in their opinions 
key barrier to development is the shortage of hard infrastructure, in particular in transport. 
Therefore on average Lisbon-type projects are to consume between 37% and 43% of the total 
resources available on regional level. In reports on implementation of Cohesion policy in 
Poland  there is repeated conclusion that over last few years the stress was not put enough on 
strategic projects. More strategic and Lisbon-type approach, concentration of resources, more 
evidence-based  and  place-based  co-ordinated  and  integrated  approach  are  needed  (MRD 
2010; MRD 2010 a). Also OECD (2008) calls for more integrated approach and more long-
term commitment in Poland.
Effects of Cohesion policy in Poland: overview
It has to be stressed that there is much more up-to-date information available on disbursement
(even on weekly basis), than performance progress. Visible result of partial replacement of 
goals: objective-attainment replaced to a large extent by spending at all costs orientation.  
While ex-post evaluation of the 2004-2006 period (14 plus one summary reports) is a vital 
source of information, the progress of Cohesion policy 2007-2013 in Poland is difficult to 
monitor and understand. The only exception are regularly up-dated econometric studies on 
                                                                           
5 Obviously the reasons for delays in motorway construction or railway modernization were of wider character: 
poor legal environment, property rights problems, environmental conflicts, lack of qualified staff in charge of 
these projects.
6  New design of package (e.g. bottle of parfumes) is considered an innovation. Same for technology introduced 
for the first time (e.g. new type of carwash).Cohesion policy impact on employment, unemployment and GDP. Therefore, to have general 
overview,  let us start with financial progress of all 21 operational programs (5 central, 16 
regional).
Table 1. Financial progress in Cohesion Policy programs implementation, 2007-2013, as of 31 
April 2011
Operational program Value  of  the  contracts 
signed  as  %  of  program 
resources
Disbursement in %
Human Capital OP 61,4 31,6
Eastern Poland Development OP 62,5 19,9
Innovative Economy OP 68,8 17,0
Infrastructure and Environment OP 56,9 13,1
European  Cross-Border  Co-
operation OP
42,1 10,4
Dolnośląskie ROP 67,3 29,6
Kujawsko-pomorskie ROP 74,3 29,9
Lubelskie 66,0 26,3







Pomorskie ROP 94,0 37,0
Śląskie  ROP 67,4 25,8
Świętokrzyskie ROP 67,1 38,6
Warmińsko-mazurskie ROP 73,1 25,2
Wielkopolskie ROP 96,9 36,6
Zachodniopomorskie ROP 68,4 25,7
Source:  MRD,  2010,  Wykorzystanie  środków  UE…,  p.4,  
http://www.mrr.gov.pl/aktualnosci/fundusze_europejskie_2007_2013/Documents/2011_04_30_miesieczna_kwie
cien.pdf, [29 May 2010]Data in table 1 suggest that regions are far more advanced in program implementation than 
Ministry for Regional Development which is Managing Authority for all central programs.
One  has to take  into account,  that unlike  in  the  regions, at  least  in some programs (e.g. 
Infrastructure and Environment) they have to deal with large and complex projects. 
According to recent MRD (2010 a) report covering 2004-2009 period, the effects of structural 
funds and Cohesion fund implementation on Poland are very significant, both on micro- and 
macro-level.  The structure of EU  funds disbursement  manifests significant differentiation 
between regions. manifests significant differentiation between regions. In the period 2004-
2006  on  basic  infrastructure  Śląskie  region  had  spent  81,5%,  Dolnośląskie   7 9,9%, 
Mazowieckie  74,1%,   Ł ódzkie  74,0%,  Pomorskie  68,2%,  Wielkopolskie  67,8%  and 
Małopolskie 65,4%, while least developed Podlaskie 39,9%, Lubelskie 52,5%, Świętorzyskie 
53,3% and Warmińsko-mazurskie 60,0% (MRD 2010 a:34).
The data, however, do not give full  and  comprehensive picture of  contemporary state of 
affairs. In various spheres it looks as follows (2004-2009).
Environment  protection  and  municipal  infrastructure. The  length  of  the  sewage  systems 
increased by  31,3 th. km (45,5%) and number of sewage treatment plants increased in 2004-
2009 by 211 (5,1%). Thanks to that the share of population having access to sewage systems 
increased from 57,4% to 61,5% (MRD 2010 a:49-51). Faster grew the length of water pipes: 
from 232,3 th km to 267,3 th. km, mostly in less developed eastern regions (including rural 
parts  of Mazowieckie  region).  Share of population  benefitting  from  access to tap water 
increased from 2003 to 2009 from 85,1 to 87,2%. Regional differences got smaller. 
Transport infrastructure. Due to insufficient maintenance of both railway tracks and roads at 
the time of accession the transport system was obsolete. In 2003 0nly 40,1% of roads was in 
good  technical  condition.  This  figure  increased  to  59,6%  in  2009.  Particularly  serious 
problem was the lack of motorways and express roads (405,1 km and 225,6 km in 2003; 849,4 
and 521,5 km in 2009) (MRD 2010 a: 61). Most of investment was in local roads, mostly not 
co-ordinated with the main transport corridors. As a result, improvement in accessibility of 
centres  of  growth  was  rather  limited  (except  for  western  parts  of  A2  and  A4). Road 
infrastructure in general is the major consumer of Cohesion policy transport related funds.
As far as railway is concerned, the situation at accession date was even worse. Only  37% of 
tracks were in a good shape; length of tracks in use had shortened until 2009 by 0,7%. Only recently this trend has been reversed. While in 2003 there was no line with the speed limit 
over 160 km per hour, in 2008 the figure was 5%. (MRD 2010 a:64). Much more successful 
was development of air transport in 11 airports (with Warsaw as a biggest one) and serving in 
2009 19,5 mio passengers (175% as compared to 2003). Water transport was and is of little 
economic and political significance. 
Social  infrastructure.  Most of funding available  in this spere was spent on educational 
infrastructure (PLN 3,7 bn
7), health sector (PLN 2,7 bn) and culture infrastructure (PLN 2,4 
bn). It resulted in significant improvement in terms of medical, social care and educational 
infrastructure and equipment. Also 74 historical objects (including many churches) and 316 
cultural, recreational and sport objects have been renovated (ibidem 82-3). 
Human capital, employment and unemployment.  
Poland’s ter tiary education has improved significantly, but still in 2008 it characterized Orly 16,5% of 
population aged 15-64, which is significantly less than OECD average  (OECD 2008: 72). The best 
situation  is  in Mazowieckie  (23,3%)  and Małopolskie regions (16,9%), while worst   in kujawsko-
pomorskie, lubuskie (13,0% each) and warmińsko-mazurskie (13,4%). Simulatenously the Dynamics 
of growth is among worlds highest (from 0,4 in 1989 mio to 2,0 mio in 2008 studying at university 
level) (KSRR –zalaczniki 2010: 101). This progress can hardly be attributed exclusively to Cohesion 
policy funding: Poles manifest high motivation to study and willingness to invest into better future
(see Kozak 2011).
In the period of 2003-2009 significant progress had been made in terms of reducing unemployment 
rate (from ca 20% to 9%, less than EU average).
8 Similar improvement was noted in employment 
rate: only 51,2% in 2003 and 59,3% in 2009. (MRD 2010 a: 84-6). It should be noted, however, that 
inter- and  in  particular  intra-regional  differences  are  quite  significant.  For  instance,  in  2011 
unemployment rate in county of Warsaw was 3,6%, while in the same Mazowieckie region, in its 
southern county of Szydłowiec, it was 37% (GUS 2011).
9
Innovativeness and information society. 
                                                                           
7 In June 2011 1EUR=3,95 PLN.
8 In April 2011 unemployment rate is ca 13%  and stable (GUS 2011).
9 Important information on regional disparities gives analysis of Gini coefficient which tends to raise in Poland 
(32,4 in 2010). Highest internal differentiation can be found in Mazowieckie region (39,2) and other 
metropolitan regions (ca 31-32), while the lowest in a group of mostly lagging behind regions of Kujawsko-
pomorskie, Warmińsko-mazurskie, Lubuskie, Opolskie and Podkarpackei (27,6-28,6)(Panek 2011:19)In recent Innovation Union Scoreboard Poland was located on 22 position in EU-27 as a country of 
low innovativeness level and its dynamics. Spending on R&D as a share of GDP in 2006 in Poland  
reached 0,56% (compared to 1,84% in EU-27, 2,61 in the USA, 2,53 in Germany, 3,45% in Finland and 
3,73% in Sweden (Eurostat 2009-488).  In 2008 only one Polish region (Mazowieckie) spent on R&D 
more  than 1%. On  the other  end  of  scale,  Lubuskie  region  – 0,09% (KSRR-załączniki,  2010: ……).
Cohesion  policy  has  some  positive  influence  on  indicators  in  this  field  but  the  progress  is 
dissappointing.
In 2005 in Poland there was 2,8 patents registered by EPO per milion inhabitants (EU-27 average was 
101,3, in Germany 269,3, Finland 223,2, Austria 180, Norway 87,1, Switzerland 395,0 (Eurostat 2009:
494). Despite visible progress in information society building (both in terms of infrastructure and 
utilization in relations with the public administration),  Poland still remains behind most European 
states. And digital exclusion is well visible. While 83% of people with tertiary education use computer 
and web,  this  figure is  only  7%  among  people  with  primary education attainment.  Similar  gap  is 
between young people and pensioners (Diagnoza 2009: 290).  The data on R&D and information 
society  (level  and  dynamics)  are  even  more surprising  when  one  realizes  that  Cohesion  policy 
declares this field as a foundation for knowledge based economy. Overall assessment of Poland’s 
competitiveness by World Economic Forum gives it 39 position (7 positions up in comparison with 
previous year) between Bahrajn (37), Czech Republic (36) and Cyprus (40), Puerto Rico (41), Barbados 
(42) and Spain (43) (WEF2010) .
This short overview suggests that while distance among Poland and other EU Member States 
is  disappearing  in  terms  of  most  typical  infrastructure  (local  roads,  traditional  railway 
infrastructure,  water  and sewage systems)  is disappearing pretty  fast thanks to European 
funds
10, the progress made in spheres related to new development paradigm  factors  (e.g. 
innovativeness) is by far slower. The quality of life seems to be a priority more important than 
competitive  advantages building.  This notion  is  confirmed  by  the overview  of structural 
changes  in  Poland.  One  may  assume,  that  any  country  at  this  particular  stage  of 
transformation and development should –using available EU support –undergo fast structural 
change towards knowledge based economy. Is it so?
Structural change
All data available show rather confusing  picture of structural changes (table 2). First of all, 
against any expectation, the sectoral structure of Poland’s economy is not characterized by 
                                                                           
10Not only Cohesion Policy, also rural areas development programmesplay locally important role.increasing share of services. Another surprising  feature  is high,  and slowly going  down 
employment in agriculture (despite the fact that it produces up to 4% of GDP)
11.  
Table 2. Selected structural data, Poland
Base year 2003 2008 EU average 2008
GDP per capita, pps (UE-
27=100), in euro
  10100 (48,9)    14100  (56,0) 25000 (100)
Net Value Added created 
in services, %
66,8 64,3 70,9
Employment rate 51,2 59,3 65,4*
Employment  in 
agriculture, % (BAEL)
18,2 14,0 6,3
Exports as % of GDP 33,3 38,9
High-tech  exports  as  % 
of total exports
2,7 3,1** 16,6**
Investment rate as % of 
GDP
18,2 22,3 -
R&D  spending  as  %  of 
GDP
0,54 0,60 1,84*
Sources: on the basis of MRD 2010 a:  22 and 142, KSRR-załączniki 2010, EUROSTAT 2009: 73 and 269; 
EUROSTAT database table tec 00001 (GDP). Remarks: * data for 2007; ** data for 2006
Data presented in Table 2 confirm the process of convergence: GDP is rising dynamically, 
exports increases, investment rate is growing, though does not represent very high values. 
There is steady reduction of employment in agriculture. On the other hand, however, against 
expectations it is not services which is growing, but industry. The role f industry increased: in 
employment  from 28,5 to 31,%,  in NVA creation from 29,6 to 29,9% (2003-2008). In the 
same time share of services in NVA creation decreased slightly from 66,0 to 64,7% (MRD 
2010 a: 22). 
One may ask what are the reasons of relatively high economic growth (convergence with the 
EU-27) with little or no structural change? First, it may come from favourable terms of trade 
on  natural  resources  (coal,  copper,  food)  which  Poland  traditionally  produces.  Second, 
dynamic export growths in Germany resulting in high demand for supply of Polish made 
                                                                           
11Small wonder when 0,7 million of farms are subsistence farms, below 5 hectares, not producing anything to 
the market and fully dependent on direct and indirect transfers from Polish and EU policies. components.  Third,  conflicting  paradigms  and  policies.  Is a gricultural  policy  with  its 
unconditional  payments to  farmland not  discouraging  small  farmers  from  changing 
occupation?
12 Is it not petrifying existing farmand employment structures? Is it not in conflict 
with Cohesion policy and EU development objectives?
Main problem with analyses of impact of  Cohesion policy seems to lie in difficulties in 
attributing changes in reality to different factors and isolating these which can be undoubtedly 
Cohesion policy effects. Most of data used for presentation of Cohesion policy impact are de 
facto only of contextual character (see national reports or 5
th cohesion report) (EC 2010 a). 
Conclusions
Our knowledge about the impact of Cohesion policy on Poland is limited and does not offer a 
full picture.  It is undisputable, that the impact is huge. However, is it of long-term (supply 
side) or short-term (demand side) in character?
A l ot of information shown in various reports as effects should be treated as description of 
product. It is not the same. Number o kilometers of motorways built in itself does not say 
anything about results, benefits from building it. And in many cases information on results are 
limited or  refer  to one aspect only  (e.g.  accessibility of services provided  in main urban 
centers). 
Quite  often  instead  of  specific  indicators  linked  with  priorities  and  activities,  the  data 
available are of general characteristic and do not discriminate between effects of Cohesion 
policy  and  other  factors that  influence situation  in  Poland  (globalization,  opening of the 
European  markets,  results  of  other  Polish  and  European  policies  etc).   W hat  is  worse, 
interpretation of certain data (on medical services availability, for instance), is questionable. 
Number of medical doctors or nurses cannot be treated as a an indicator of quality (“the more, 
the better”). The quality depends also on other factors, such as equipment availability and 
organization. 
                                                                           
12Unlike in most other EU Member States, in Poland financial support from CAP (pillar one)is made available to 
every farmer (owner of more than 1 hectar) without any conditions. Only special payments to specific 
production sectors require certain activities (e.g. plantation of trees or bushes, such as walnut trees, which, as 
everybody knows, have little chances to survive northern climate).Anyway, we can safely say that there is no sector that would not be supported by European 
funds. The question remains, whether this is the reason for satisfaction or dissatisfaction (low 
ability to concentrate on strategic issues). The fastest implementation can be attributed to 
small, local projects of little or no impact on development, while the slowest absorption refers 
to  large,  serving  many,  strategic  projects  of  potentially  significant  long-term  impact  on 
development. And Lisbon-type projects, which may help to improve competitive position of 
Poland. There is also insufficient co-ordination within the system as another factor reducing 
positive influence. Most of remarks found in ex-post evaluation of ERDF intervention 2000-
06 is fully applicable to Poland. 
On the macro-level, very  positive is the significant impact on employment, unemployment 
and GDP creation. Impact reaching 0,4-0,9 percentage point above the “no-cohesion” line is 
truly impressive. On the other hand, however, one has to bear in mind that according to some 
think  tanks  producing  econometric  analyses  this  impact  will  be  reduced  to  zero  when 
European resources will come to an end (MRD 2010a:  27). Finally, there is little structural 
change. That would suggest that there will be no or little benefits for the future generations 
left.  That  too  much  resources  has  been  spent  up-to-now on  quality  of  life  and  filling 
civilizational gaps rather than truly development projects.
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